Russian Residents' Attitudes Toward the Law-Enforcement Agencies

A Review of Recent Research
To function, every social system requires institutions that maintain law and order in society. The society's sociopolitical and ideological circumstances determine what these law-enforcement institutions do. For decades, Soviet law-enforcement agencies operated as one element of a repressive system of social control that ensured the stability and legitimacy of the regime. From decade to decade, however, the state influenced these agencies in different ways, which has had a negative impact on how the agencies function even today.
Images of Law-Enforcement Officers in Russian History
At the dawn of Soviet society, the law-enforcement agencies provided a means to "normalize" the country's political climate by The initiative for this study came from the Public Verdict (Obshchestvennyi verdikt) Foundation.
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reducing legal and ideological tenets to a "common denominator." They did this by persecuting and physically destroying potential sources of destabilization. In that period the agencies played a vital role for the authorities and were highly valued as a result.
The interaction between the authorities and the law-enforcement agencies at that time can be characterized as institutional particularism. In contrast to democratic societies, where the activities of the law-enforcement agencies are based on universal law, the interaction between the authorities and the law-enforcement agencies in Soviet society was largely initiated by the regime, sometimes even bypassing the official legislature. The effective functioning of the repressive machine made this situation necessary. After World War II, propaganda portrayed the internal affairs agent as close to heroic and the policeman as an embodiment of justice, order, and security. Both the regime and the population felt it necessary to restore normative structures and eliminate deviant practices in everyday life. Law-enforcement officers saw themselves as important and needed, which accounted for a certain amount of symbolic and social capital among this stratum of people. But as the political system of real socialism deteriorated, this image began to lose its heroic luster, as we can see in examples from literature and cinema. This happened, on the one hand, because of the relative calm in the country and, on the other, because the state confronted new overarching goals-namely, a competition among world powers for advantage in the conquest of outer space, nuclear research, and advances in the defense industry. These overarching goals aroused the regime's interest in new social institutions producing real output. Law enforcement lost its top priority among state tasks. Its symbolic capital gradually dissolved, turning policemen into ordinary frontline workers and creating a certain sense of deprivation among them.
In the late Soviet period the ordinary mind saw the social portrait of a policeman as somewhat comical. Fear and anxious respect of the law-enforcement agencies gave way to critical and ironic distance. More and more, people concentrated on solving their own problems and paid lip service to the authorities while preferring to have as little to do with them as possible. They related to the police as a manifestation of the regime-with apprehension but without real respect, even though officially and through cultural channels, the authorities promoted (more or less unsuccessfully) the elevated social significance of the service that is "both dangerous and difficult." The men in white uniforms who walked the streets and squares of Soviet cities, ready to rescue the ordinary citizen, donned gray uniforms instead. The incorruptible and honest guardians of law and order became the butt of jokes and caricatures of various types. The masses ridiculed the line "my police protect me," and The Investigation Is Being Conducted by Experts mutated from a crime show into a cartoon: The Investigation Is Being Conducted by Koloboks.* At present, only 1.2 percent of Russia's residents list policeman, traffic policeman, and tax inspector as prestigious professions, and 2.1 percent consider these lucrative jobs.
1 Only 2.5 percent would be willing to take a job as a policeman or state-security agent.
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When asked how they assess their own security, only 25 percent of the respondents trust local and central government bodies (the police, welfare agencies, the courts, and the prosecutors). Most respondents (68 percent) count on their family, relatives, and friends for protection. Half as many (34 percent) count on the state and the president, and the law-enforcement agencies take third place (27 percent). 3 The declining prestige of the law-enforcement agencies has made it necessary to provide the officers with moral compensation, even as it has given the authorities an opportunity to use law-enforcement resources to serve their own interests. In this way, the authorities have transformed the functions of law enforcement and turned it into a type of "undercover game." When the authorities ignore overt police functions, these slowly give way to covert functions that are financially rewarded-functions different from those originally characteristic of the institution and structuring its * This paragraph contains a series of pop-culture references. "Both dangerous and difficult" is a line from the theme song to The Investigation Is Being Conducted by Experts, a popular crime show. "My police protect me" comes from one of Vladimir Mayakovsky's poems, and Kolobok (which means a "round loaf") is a character from a Russian fairy tale who is naive, stupid, and boastful.-Trans.
activity. The police have gradually lost their image as incorruptible guardians of law and order. Their not-affluent financial situation, the absence of symbolic capital, the authorities' disinterest in making them perform their proper function, and the indirect imposition of double standards on them have given rise to a new type of police officer. A policeman whom neither the authorities nor ordinary people take seriously, who no longer harbors illusions of himself as a hero but continues to wield power over the citizenry, finds himself in an ambiguous position. Against the backdrop of market relations and the formation of a new type of public hero-a financially secure individual who does not adhere to the norms and values inculcated in the Soviet period-police officers experience themselves as deprived. The erosion of a sense of duty, the devaluation of the ethics of a service structured in accord with Soviet norms, and the officially promoted prestige given to money are inculcating among law-enforcement officers a commercial approach to their responsibilities. 4 The largely unregulated power over citizens that remains at the officers' disposal has become the basis for the formation of an internal corporate policy. Law-enforcement agencies have begun to extract profit from their only resource: power. In the 1990s corruption in Russia's internal affairs agencies flourished, and this reality is no longer a mystery hidden by seven seals. The masses universally proclaim-or accept by default-the slogan "People make ends meet any way they can." Each social group is trying to make its own adjustment to the current crisis. Retirees collect bottles, teachers offer private tutoring, and police officers accept contracts to protect groups of citizens for whom they are responsible. No one these days expects anyone to be above taking money. Those who work for the state are in the worst position. The state cannot guarantee them a dignified life, so they have to look for additional sources of income.
Professional "Ethics" Among Law-Enforcement Officers
As the Moscow Helsinki Group has correctly stated, however, political and economic factors are not the sole determinants of professional ethics. 5 The imperfect legal foundation governing law-enforcement activities leaves loopholes bypassing official legislation-specifically, anticorruption legislation-even as it sets up a rewards system based on subjective assessments of employees by those of high status within the institutions.
As well as these external causes, internal factors also play a significant role. Primarily, this means the current corporate culture, which is partly a distortion of law-enforcement officers' heroic sense of self. A heroic self-identification is indispensable among members of professions that involve risking one's life. In lists of the most dangerous occupations, law-enforcement officers-specifically policemen, traffic policemen, and tax inspectors-take second place after the group that includes firemen, rescue workers, divers, miners, and sappers. Awareness of the imperfect legislative foundation combined with poor legal training leads to the development of new criteria governing the interaction among law-enforcement officers. A low-level employee regards the authority of his or her immediate boss as more significant than an abstract law that is not observed. According to a survey conducted by the Moscow Helsinki Group among employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 44 percent of convicted officers committed felonies not so much out of greed as from a desire "to prove their worth to superiors." 6 People who came to law enforcement from hot spots have played a special role in the formation of the agencies' corporate culture. Military operations have a significant impact on personality formation. The psychological tenets that an individual acquires in wartime are not entirely compatible with life in peacetime. Increased aggression and distorted views of the law and of relationships within a collective body of co-workers can also lead to professional disorientation.
Types of Felonies Committed by Law-Enforcement Officers
We can identify two main types of felonies committed by lawenforcement officers: "commercial" felonies and those connected with professional disorientation among the guardians of the law. The first type is more rational and predictable. Here a relationship changes from one rationale-an official, nonprofit state type-to another, informal type that in some cases works better for both partners. This type of alienation of the law-enforcement agencies and of the population from the state and from lawmaking is clearly financial in nature. Law-enforcement officers may, however, not only offer services for a certain fee but sometimes also impose them, which deprives the other party of choice.
The second type of felony that law-enforcement officers committhe ones caused by professional disorientation-bother the public more. For example, officers may obstruct justice by applying the rules of conducting an investigation dictated by their corporate culture, thus committing "service" crimes. 7 To "optimize" their work, they may coerce people into testifying or resort to blackmail, misinformation, physical violence, and falsification of evidence. Nationwide surveys conducted by the Levada Center at the initiative of the Public Verdict Foundation have found that the public most fears insults and humiliation from law-enforcement officers (24 percent), their own vulnerability before the law-enforcement agencies, and the absence of public oversight (23 percent).
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Trust in the Law-Enforcement Agencies
Our analysis of the interactions among the authorities, the lawenforcement agencies, and the public reveals a divergence between official functions and status and what the agencies actually do. Overt functions are neglected while latent functions pull the subjects of mutual relationships into a vague web of interactions. The result creates new structures for the relationships, even as it expands the repertoire of potential actions and the range of prospects. Even though the law-enforcement agencies experience a certain alienation from the authorities, the public regards them both as independent structures within the vague relationship web. Almost two-thirds of Russia's residents (61 percent) believe that police officers act in their own interests, not to ensure the safety of the country's population. 9 Despite the overall climate of alienation that arises from the logic of the relationship described above, the authorities and the law-enforcement agencies are united by their shared resource: power. Here society plays a subordinate role, a situation aggravated by the public's internal alienation from institutions with power. The conviction that powerful institutions act in their own self-interest makes people distrust them. Two-thirds, and in some months three-fourths, of Russians indicate that they do not trust the law-enforcement agencies. 10 Most often, those who select this response are between twenty-five and thirty-nine (73 percent) or forty and fifty-four years old (75 percent). People who have a higher education also agree (73 percent) ( Table 1) .
Analyzing the Index of Trust in Security and Law-Enforcement Agencies, we note that police officers have the least moral authority, followed by the prosecutors and the judiciary. Admittedly, in recent months, the moral authority of the judiciary has risen somewhat ( Figure 1 ), and more people now trust this institution than do not trust it. Trust in the police has remained low since the beginning of the survey.
In analyzing changes in the Index of Trust in Security and LawEnforcement Agencies, we notice that trust grew rapidly when Vladimir Putin came to power. Because Putin had worked for state security, his presidency signified a change in the agencies' status, Note: Here and below, percentages are based on integrated data. We consider this procedure acceptable because the deviations in measured indicators were insignificant during the survey period, and fluctuations do not exceed the statistical margin of error. Jan.
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Sept. and the public revised its opinion of them. In subsequent years, the public's hopes for fundamental changes in the security agencies' rationale were dashed, and its trust in them returned to the initial level.
We can also see a considerable decline in trust placed in the army beginning in early 2006, which can be explained by the high-profile hazing scandal associated with the soldier Sychev.
Russians' Views on the Urgency of the Problems of Lawlessness and Arbitrariness
There is a clear link between distrust of the law-enforcement agencies and assessments of how urgent it is to stop lawless and arbitrary behavior by them. Four out of five Russian residents think that this problem is somewhat serious or very serious, and almost half (40 percent) consider it very serious (Table 2 ). Since we began monitoring police arbitrariness in July 2004, this number has remained relatively stable. If we take into account the impact of age as a factor in assessments of lawlessness and arbitrariness, we can see that the greatest concern is expressed by people between twenty-five and fifty-four years old (85 percent) and by those with a higher (87 percent) or vocational education (85 percent). The Authorities' Use of Law-Enforcement Agencies to Counter Political Opponents
As noted above, the law-enforcement agencies occupy an ambivalent position vis-à-vis the authorities. On the one hand, there is alienation: the authorities are not fully interested in the direct performance of law enforcement, and the guardians of the law see other potential avenues for their activities. On the other hand, the institutional connection between the law-enforcement agencies and the authorities is relatively strong. Formally, the law-enforcement agencies are charged not only with maintaining law and order in society but also with mediating and legally regulating the relationship between the authorities and society. Law-enforcement agencies can then become a means of potential manipulation by groups with large resources. In this arena of interaction, the authorities sometimes demonstrate an interest in creating their own model of relationship development and in determining the situation. This is where they require the loyalty of the law-enforcement agencies. Since the authorities have various types of resources at their disposal, they can obtain the agencies' loyalty in various ways. One possible manifestation of such an interaction is the authorities' use of law-enforcement agencies against their political opponents. Almost half of Russia's residents (49 percent) are convinced that the authorities act in this way. More often than not, the people who express such views are adults but not pensioners (53 percent of those aged between twenty-five and thirtynine, 54 percent of those between forty and fifty-four), have a higher education (56 percent) (Table 3 ) and high income levels (55 percent). Geographically, the group represents the Central (52 percent), the Siberian (52 percent), and the Far East (54 percent) federal okrugs as well as medium-size towns with populations between a hundred thousand and five hundred thousand (53 percent).
Citizens' Apprehensions Regarding the Security Agencies
The Index of Civil Concern (ICC) is compiled monthly from data on people's trust in and anxiety regarding police lawlessness and arbitrariness. The index enables us to assess the level of public concern about the general situation in law enforcement on a monthly basis. In addition, our project monitors two other indices-the Index of Personal Concern (IPC) and the Index of Personal Vulnerability (IPV). In contrast to the ICC, the IPC and the IPV show how concerned citizens feel about their own situation rather than about society as a whole. The IPC reveals how much people fear that they will become victims of police lawlessness and arbitrariness, and the IPV shows the extent to which people feel protected from such behavior. The IPC is based on assessments by Russia's residents of how likely they are to suffer from police lawlessness and arbitrariness and of their personal safety. Three-fourths of Russians (74 percent) consider it likely that they will become victims of police lawlessness and arbitrariness; this number has remained relatively constant throughout the survey period, fluctuating by only 3-4 percentage points. This concern is somewhat more common among individuals age twenty-five to thirty-nine and forty to fifty-four (79 percent in both groups)-the former in all probability due to their daily activities, and the latter because they have a certain amount of resources, which may attract law-enforcement officers (Table 4) .
Citizens' Protection from Arbitrary Behavior by Law-Enforcement Agencies
The overwhelming majority of Russian residents (81 percent) feel that they are not protected from potential police arbitrariness (Table  5) . Again, this feeling is more characteristic of people between forty and fifty-four (84 percent), those with limited means (84 percent), and residents of the Northwestern, Central, and Siberian federal okrugs (83 percent in each group). The IPV shows how much people believe they can counteract arbitrariness by making appeals within the judicial system (Table  6 ). Only one-third of Russia's residents (30 percent) rely on the courts or the prosecutors to protect them from police arbitrariness, and more than half (59 percent) think that these institutions cannot restore their rights. Those between forty and fifty-four (64 percent) and those with limited means (65 percent) are least likely to look to the courts and the prosecutors for protection. More than half of Russians (60 percent) do not expect much legal redress for judicial 
arbitrariness either, especially people between forty and fifty-four (65 percent) and with limited means (64 percent).
In comparing the three indices described above, we notice that the IPC is higher than the other two. Therefore, not only do Russia's residents experience general anxiety but they view themselves even more as potential victims of arbitrariness. The drop in the indices in March and November 2005 can be explained by the unpopular reforms introduced at that time, which caused considerable concern (Figure 2) . At that moment, people focused on the monetization of benefits and the reform of housing and communal services.
The ICC is highest among Russian residents between twenty-five and thirty-nine and between forty and fifty-four (Figure 3) . Younger people resemble those of retirement age in terms of civil concern more than they do the intermediate age groups.
Personal concern is also more characteristic of Russians between twenty-five and thirty-nine and between forty and fifty-four ( Figure  4) . In October 2004 and in October 2005, however, personal concern surged among people from eighteen to twenty-four. At that time Aug.
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The older working-age group is also more inclined to feel personally vulnerable. People between twenty-five and thirty-nine, however, yield second place to the oldest group (fifty-five and over). Youth score lowest on the Index of Personal Vulnerability ( Figure 5) .
On the whole, the most socially involved population groups are more worried about arbitrariness by law-enforcement agencies ( Figure 6 ). Before June 2005 people aged fifty-five and older had similar attitudes toward police arbitrariness, but that level rose from June to October 2005. 
Types of Law-Enforcement Activity That Cause Particular Concern Among Russian Residents
Now we will analyze in detail what worries Russians about police arbitrariness. Here we can distinguish two aspects of concern-general concerns and fears for their own well-being. General concerns, associated with systemic characteristics of the law-enforcement agencies, are mostly expressed as fears of criminality among law-enforcement officers (62 percent), crimes against individuals (58 percent), officers' exploitation of their positions to serve other goals (48 percent), and persecution of troublesome people (30 percent).
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Fear of police criminality (Table 7) is found among the socially active age groups (64 percent of those from twenty-five to thirtynine and 69 percent of those from forty to fifty-four); working Crimes against individuals also cause more concern for the socially active age groups (62 percent of those from twenty-five to thirty-nine and 64 percent of those from forty to fifty-four); residents of Moscow (64 percent), large cities (66 percent), and medium-size towns (63 percent); and people with above-average means (63 percent) and a higher education (61 percent). In addition, however, such fears are also more frequently found among people from eighteen to twenty-four (59 percent), schoolchildren and college students (64 percent), and the unemployed (67 percent). If we analyze crimes against individuals in more detail, it is noteworthy that 34 percent fear insults and humiliation; 25 percent worry about blackmail and threats; 32 percent fear physical violence and torture; 25 percent are concerned about planted drugs, weapons, and perjury; 28 percent worry about illegal detention (imprisonment); and 10 percent anticipate brutality committed while dispersing meetings, pickets, and demonstrations. It merits attention that youth are more afraid than others of threats and blackmail (33 percent), physical violence and torture (35 percent), and planted drugs, weapons, and perjury (32 percent). Residents of Moscow worry more about insults and humiliation (43 percent); planted drugs, weapons and perjury (39 percent); and illegal detention (40 percent).
The possibility of police officers exploiting their positions most worries the socially active age groups (52 percent of people from twenty-five to thirty-nine and 53 percent of those from forty to fifty-four), working people (54 percent), those who have a higher education (54 percent) and a high consumer status (53 percent), and residents of Moscow (53 percent) and of medium-size towns (53 percent). Specifically, 20 percent of the respondents worried about refusals to accept and investigate criminal cases and to search for missing persons, 11 percent were concerned about prosecutorial bias in conducting investigations or in court, and 34 percent feared extortion from the traffic police. People between twenty-five and thirty-nine (24 percent), as well as those with a higher education (37 percent) worry more about refusals to accept and investigate criminal cases and to search for missing persons. These groups are also more concerned about extortion from automobile drivers, as are men (39 percent) and individuals with above-average means (41 percent), as these are the groups more likely to own a car. The persecution of troublesome people also causes more concern for people under retirement age (32 percent), as well as housewives (36 percent), the unemployed (38 percent), and residents of Moscow (39 percent) and the Far East Okrug (37 percent). People worry about police interference in citizens' private lives (17 percent), the persecution of whistle blowers (14 percent), police interference in economic disputes (6 percent), and the persecution of dissidents and members of the political opposition (6 percent).
Among problems of general concern, first comes the corruption of the police, investigative organs, judges, and court officials (41 percent); second is people's vulnerability relative to the lawenforcement agencies and the absence of public oversight (37 percent); and third is insults and humiliations (34 percent), the traffic police's extortion from car owners (34 percent), and physical violence and torture (32 percent). In terms of their own lives, people most fear insults and humiliation from law-enforcement officers (24 percent), their vulnerability relative to the law-enforcement agencies, the absence of public oversight (23 percent), illegal detention (imprisonment) (18 percent), extortion by the traffic police (18 percent), and physical violence and torture (18 percent) (Figure 7 ).
If we create a typology of law-enforcement activities that cause personal concern, we can identify six main types: crimes against individuals (39 percent), criminality among law-enforcement officers (17 percent), the absence of public oversight (33 percent), extortion from car drivers and migrants (21 percent), unwarranted police interference in citizens' lives (13 percent), and the use of the law-enforcement agencies for political purposes (9 percent). 12 Crimes against individuals are more feared by people under retirement age (42 percent), individuals with vocational training (46 percent) and a higher education (41 percent), and those with above-average means (44 percent). The least concern over this issue Among crimes against individuals, Russians most fear insults and humiliation (24 percent), which particularly worry individuals with a higher education (27 percent) and vocational training (28 percent); residents of Moscow (27 percent) and of other large cities (28 percent); and residents of the Far East (27 percent) and Volga federal okrugs (31 percent). They also express concern over illegal detention (18 percent)-especially if they are under retirement age (20 percent versus 14 percent), have vocational training (22 percent) or a higher education (21 percent), or live in the Siberian Federal Okrug (27 percent). Less frequently, servicemen, employees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor's Office (9 percent), and retirees (12 percent) also worry about illegal detention. Physical violence and torture worries 18 percent, especially residents of the Siberian Federal Okrug (25 percent), Moscow (22 percent), and other large cities (23 percent) and those with above-average means (24 percent). Blackmail and threats (14 percent) particularly bother residents of large cities (17 percent), whereas planted drugs, weapons, and perjury (11 percent) most worry people aged between eighteen and twenty-four (15 percent), individuals with a higher Feducation (14 percent), those with above-average means (18 percent), and residents of the Far East Okrug (19 percent) and Moscow (17 percent).
Types of police criminality included extortion of money from private entrepreneurs and businesses and protection rackets offered to commercial structures. These schemes worry 6 percent of Russia's residents. Seven percent cited other types of police extortion, and 6 percent mentioned participation of the police in organized crime and of organized crime groups in law enforcement ("werewolves in epaulets"). Public concern about such problems varies among regions. The highest concern is expressed in the Far East Federal Okrug. There, 14 percent of respondents worried about extortion and protection rackets, another 14 percent cited other types of extortion, 15 percent worried about the "werewolves in epaulets," and 9 percent complained about police participation in organized crime. Nine to 10 percent of those living in large cities also fear extortion.
Russians also worry considerably about the absence of public oversight of law enforcement, which leaves people vulnerable to police abuse (23 percent); about corruption among the police, investigative organs, judges, and court officials (14 percent); and about refusals to file and investigate criminal cases and to search for missing persons (7 percent). Personal vulnerability particularly concerns members of the older working-age group (27 percent), individuals with limited means (27 percent), and residents of the Urals (27 percent), Southern (29 percent), and Far East federal okrugs (30 percent) and of large cities (27 percent) and medium-size towns (26 percent). Corruption in law enforcement most worries people with a higher education (21 percent) and residents of the Urals Federal Okrug (20 percent), whereas refusals to file and investigate criminal cases and to search for missing persons particularly bother people with a higher education (11 percent) and residents of the Southern (13 percent) and Urals federal okrugs (12 percent).
Eighteen percent feared the traffic police's extortion from automobile drivers, and 5 percent listed the extortion of money from foreign citizens accused of lacking proper registration. Extortion from automobile drivers especially bothers men (22 percent), individuals with a higher education (23 percent), those with aboveaverage means (26 percent), and residents of the Northwestern (21 percent), Urals (27 percent), and Siberian federal okrugs (24 percent) and of cities with populations over five hundred thousand (21 percent). Extortion from migrants most troubles residents of the Southern (8 percent) and Far East federal okrugs (10 percent).
Unwarranted police interference in citizens' lives-that is, their personal lives and their economic disputes-concerns 13 and 2 percent of Russia's residents, respectively. Interference in their personal lives most worries residents of the Northwestern (22 percent) and Far East federal okrugs (25 percent) and of small towns with populations between ten thousand and a hundred thousand (19 percent).
Russians worry least about use of the law-enforcement agencies for political purposes (Table 8) . This category includes prosecutorial bias in investigations and in court (7 percent); brutality while breaking up rallies, pickets, and demonstrations (5 percent); persecution of whistle blowers (4 percent); and prosecution of dissidents and political opponents (2 percent). Considering how rarely such views are expressed, it is difficult to link them to specific sociodemographic characteristics.
Police Arbitrariness in Russia's Regions
Concern over police arbitrariness varies among regions. We can note here that people trust the police less in the Northwestern (75 percent), Central (73 percent), and Siberian regions (72 percent). Police lawlessness and arbitrariness is also cited more often by residents of the Central (85 percent) and Siberian federal okrugs (86 percent). These regions and the Far East Federal Okrug also worry more about the authorities' use of the law-enforcement agencies to silence their political opponents-something that worries 52 and 54 percent of the residents, respectively.
Fear of personally suffering from police arbitrariness is highest in the Northwestern and Siberian federal okrugs, where that possibility worries 78 percent of the residents. There and in the Central and Southern federal okrugs, more people feel vulnerable to arbitrariness (83 percent in the Central, Northwestern, and Siberian federal okrugs, and 82 percent in the Southern Federal Okrug). In the Northwestern and Central federal okrugs, people are less likely to trust the courts and the prosecutors (61 and 62 percent) and the law as a whole (61 and 63 percent, respectively). The ICC varies significantly across regions, but it reaches its height in the Central, Siberian, and Northwestern federal okrugs. The IPC peaks in the Northwestern, Siberian, and Southern federal okrugs, and the IPV is highest in the Northwestern, Central, and Siberian federal okrugs (Figure 8) .
If we analyze the issue of police arbitrariness more specifically, we can note that police criminality especially troubles residents of Moscow (70 percent) and the Far East (64 percent) and Northwest (64 percent) federal okrugs. Crimes against individuals also worry the population of Moscow (64 percent) and the Northwest (59 percent) and Volga federal okrugs (63 percent). Inhabitants of these regions are also more likely to worry that law-enforcement officers may abuse their authority (53 and 50 percent, respectively). Residents of Moscow (39 percent) and the Far East (37 percent) and Central federal okrugs (33 percent) worry about the persecution of troublesome people.
Crimes against individuals are the personal concerns that most worry residents of the Volga (45 percent) and Far East federal okrugs (44 percent) and Moscow (43 percent). Residents of the Far East (27 percent), Southern (24 percent), and Volga (19 percent) federal okrugs fear police criminality. Absence of public oversight troubles residents of the Far East (45 percent), Southern (41 percent), and Urals (39 percent) federal okrugs. Extortion from automobile drivers and migrants bothers residents of the Urals (27 percent), Siberian (26 percent), and Far East (25 percent) federal okrugs. Unwarranted police interference in citizens' lives concerns residents of the Far East (26 percent) and Northwest (24 percent) federal okrugs. The population of the Far East (13 percent), Siberian (11 percent), and Northwestern (11 percent) federal okrugs fear police involvement in politics.
Analyzing the significance of the Index of Police Arbitrariness in different federal okrugs, we can see that the Northwestern, Central, and Siberian federal okrugs appear less secure ( Figure 9 ).
As we can see from the data cited here, the moral authority of the law-enforcement agencies is extremely low. This is not only because the prestige of police officers and prosecutors has declined but also because the relationships in which law-enforcement agencies are engaged have been fundamentally restructured. In contrast to the Soviet period, when law enforcement was primarily based on the principle "the government is one with the law-enforcement agencies and the population" and thus in many ways predictable, new major resource players-namely, business organizations and criminal groups-have now emerged in the sociopolitical and economic space. The network of interactions in which law enforcement now takes place has become more complicated and, therefore, less predictable. As we can see from the survey findings, residents of Russia attribute the causes of police arbitrariness not only to obvious self-interest among the agencies or to instructions issued by the government but also to police involvement with criminal and business organizations. In response to the expanding spectrum of opportunities for commercial involvement, law-enforcement officers are naturally reoriented toward other, more lucrative types of "professional" employment. This explains both the public's distrust of law enforcement and the officers' disregard of that distrust. 
